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Introduction
Opinion polls conducted in Germany and Austria have shown that the public
have been increasingly afraid of the consequences of opening the European Union’s
labour market to the citizens of Central European countries. In Germany, Gerhard
Schröder, candidate for chancellor from the opposition SPD party in the upcoming
elections, while supporting Poland’s accession to the Union, at the same time proposed
the application of transition periods concerning the access of Polish workers to the EU
labour market. The German politician holds the opinion that, if Poles enjoyed the right
to work in EU countries, that might lead to social tensions and boost the popularity of
right wing parties.1 Members of the ruling CSU parliamentary group in the Bundestag
also placed numerous conditions upon their approval of the Union’s enlargement to the
East. They are also predominantly interested in restricting the free movement of people
during the time needed to level the economic situation of the old and future members.
According to the members of the German parliament, that period should last at least
until 2015.2
In Poland, there have also been opinions warning against threats posed by
integration with the European Union for Polish agriculture, industry, or finally, for
Poland’s sovereignty and identity. That attitude towards integration involves a
temptation to extend protection periods for Polish agriculture or the steel industry in
exchange for restricting the right of Poles to settle and work freely in the EU
countries. Krzysztof Popowicz, author of a report published by the Institute of Public
Affairs,3 believes that consent to such an arrangement would make Poles second class
European citizens.
The Institute of Public Affairs has conducted research concerning the
expectations of Poles related to negotiations with the European Union. The research
was carried out under the project monitoring integration processes,4 with the main goal
of determining which of the issues covered by the ongoing negotiations are viewed as
the most important by Poles. The study was also meant to determine whether or not
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2there was any relationship between the attitudes towards the main negotiation topics
and the general attitude towards integration with the European Union, and if so, what
the relationship was. The question was whether the order of priorities of the social
groups which declare the strongest support for integration is the same as the order of
priorities of those who are indifferent or negative about Poland’s accession to the
European Union.
It is also very important to follow on a regular basis the changes occurring in
the attitudes of Poles towards integration with the European Union. Since the
launching of the negotiations, there has been a growing number of media reports on
the subject, and contentious issues have been tackled more frequently. This may have
an impact on the perception of integration processes by the public.
Main Conclusions
• Yet another decline was observed in support for integration with the European
Union. At the moment, the number of people declaring their readiness to vote for
Poland’s accession to the EU in a possible referendum is lower compared to
February.
• A fall in support for Poland’s accession to the EU was seen mainly among those
social groups which are usually less positive towards integration, while the opposite
trend was observed among college and university graduates whose support for
integration is stronger compared to other social groups. Hence, one may notice a
growing polarisation of opinions held by the public.
• The public in Poland attach a major importance both to the future of agriculture and
to the right of Poles to work abroad. However, the latter topic of the negotiations is
more vital to those social groups which declare particularly strong support for
integration with the European Union.
• The issue of free purchase of land by foreigners received relatively little attention
from the public, including farmers. Only 15% of the surveyed farmers considered
the issue one of the two most important topics of the ongoing negotiations.
• No direct relationship was observed between the support for Poland negotiating
successfully the right for its citizens to work freely in the EU countries, and the
respondents’ individual readiness to work abroad. The majority of Poles supporting
integration see their future in Poland’s growing private sector. Readiness to move
abroad was not pegged to the level of support for integration.
• Two leading attitudes towards negotiations with the EU may be observed among
the Polish public: one held by those who believe that the goal of the talks is to
safeguard the Polish status quo, and another one by those who see the negotiations
as a chance to further modernise their country by means of creating new
development opportunities.
• The strongest defensive attitudes were seen among farmers, as 25% of them
declared plans to vote against integration, while 25% would vote for. However, that
attitude is not equally characteristic of the entire rural population, 53% of whom
would support integration. These figures reflect a growing differentiation of
opinions among the rural population.
3• In the course of time, not only the attitudes towards integration have been
changing, but also opinions concerning the benefits and disadvantages of the
process for particular social groups. Several years ago, the perception of the
situation of farmers and blue-collar workers was more optimistic, whereas now,
there is a prevailing belief that the two groups will incur losses as a result of the
integration process.
1. Changes in the attitude of the Polish public
towards the European Union
Negotiations with the European Union have encouraged a growing interest in
these issues by the media. Many publications and statements tackle on contentious
matters. That may be connected with a decline in public support for Poland’s accession
to European structures, which has been observed in our research. At the moment, the
number of people declaring their readiness to vote in favour of Poland’s accession to
the European Union in a possible referendum is lower compared to February 1998.
It is interesting to note that the fall in the number of people declaring support
for Poland’s accession to the EU has not been accompanied by a simultaneous increase
in the number of respondents disapproving of the process, but a growth was seen in
the number of people who could not make a definite decision on the subject. This may
reflect a growing uncertainty and confusion related to the integration process.
Table 1
Declarations of vote in a possible referendum concerning
Poland’s accession to the European Union
Declared way of voting
Replies (in percent)
N=1066, February
1998
N=1100, June 1998
In favour of Poland’s accession to
the EU
64 58
Against Poland’s accession to the
EU
9 10
Will not vote in the referendum 13 11
Don’t know 14 21
Total 100 100
Source: Data obtained by the Institute of Public Affairs
The strongest support for Poland’s accession to the European Union was
declared by college and university graduates, respondents holding managerial
positions, white-collar workers, as well as by the unemployed, young people and
students.
The research showed that the knowledge of at least one foreign language at a
level enabling communication with foreigners was a variable differentiating Poles’
attitude towards European integration. The lack of language barriers in communication
with representatives of other nations encouraged support for Poland’s accession to the
4European Union. A positive attitude towards European integration was additionally
encouraged by close contacts abroad and familiarity with West European countries.5
People who have worked abroad more frequently support integration (74%) compared
to those who have never had such experience in their career life (58%). The group
comprised of people who had no experience of working abroad included a much
greater number of respondents who did not know how they would vote in the
accession referendum.
A positive attitude towards Poland’s negotiations with the European Union
was declared by the unemployed who viewed the opening of borders and market
unification as an opportunity to return to active career life and improve their individual
situation in the labour market.
The intention of voting against Poland’s accession to the Union was more
common among elder respondents, people with less education and lower incomes per
head in a household, as well as among farm workers (28%) and farmers (25%). On the
other hand, it is interesting to note that, overall, the attitudes of the rural population
did not vary from the national average. Only 13% of respondents living in rural areas
would vote against integration. The figure reflects a growing differentiation of
opinions among the rural population, which may be seen, for example, in a much
greater reluctance shown by farmers towards European integration, compared to the
overall population of rural areas.
A comparison of attitudes declared by Poles in March and in June 1998, may
lead to the conclusion that support for the country’s accession to the EU has fallen
mainly among those groups of respondents who have been traditionally less positive
towards the process, i.e., among elder people, the lowest income earners, pensioners,
and housewives.
An exception from that rule has been a relatively large decline in support
declared by young people (under 24 years of age) who usually support integration.
Opinions held by that group show little stability, and therefore, will tend to vary.
Despite an overall fall in support for Poland’s accession to the European
Union, a growth in approval of the process was observed among college and university
graduates, people holding managerial positions, and white-collar workers. That may
reflect a growing polarisation of opinions held by the Polish public.
In general terms, one may say that the current decline in support for European
integration does not mean an increase in the popularity of anti-European attitudes, but
only a growth in uncertainty and hesitation related to the ongoing negotiations. These
appear to be connected with a growing amount of information circulated about the
process of negotiations, a more frequent discussion of contentious issues, and the
public’s uncertainty concerning the goals of the ongoing talks, as the Polish political
elites have not managed to formulate these goals distinctly and clearly to date.
2.  The perception negotiation issues by the public
The ongoing talks between Poland and the European Union concern a great
number of issues mostly related to the harmonisation of Polish legislation with the
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5acquis communautaire. However, particular issues tackled on during the negotiations
receive varied interest from the public in Poland and in the EU member states.
Poles attach the greatest importance to issues concerning the future of
agriculture and the achievement of the right to work on the EU territory. A large
interest in enabling Poles to work in the EU has been accompanied by a much lesser
pressure placed upon achieving the right to settle freely in the EU member states. This
may suggest that Poles are more interested in short term work abroad rather than
permanent migration.
Table 2
Issues considered to be the most important in negotiations
between Poland and the European Union
Negotiation issues
Group of respondents (in
percent) attaching importance
to a particular issue
N=1100
The future of Polish agriculture 66
The right of Poles to work in the EU member
states
54
The right of Poles to settle freely in the EU
member states
37
The future of the Polish coal mining industry 21
The right enabling foreigners to buy land freely in
Poland
10
The figures in the right column do not add up to 100% because respondents indicated
two issues which they considered the most important during the negotiations.
Source: Data obtained by the Institute of Public Affairs.
The future of the Polish coal mining industry aroused lesser concern compared
to the future of agriculture because, in the consciousness of Poles, the former issue
affects a relatively smaller number of people. Prospects for the coal industry were
considered an important issue in the context of negotiations especially by people
holding managerial positions, respondents with primary education, and inhabitants of
large cities.
It is also worth stressing that relatively few people regarded the sale of land to
foreigners as one of the most important issues for the negotiations.
The future of Polish agriculture is considered vital among the topics for
negotiations with the Union mainly by elder people and, naturally, by people directly
connected with agriculture, i.e., farmers, farm workers, and inhabitants of rural areas.
Young people pay the least attention to that issue.
The right to work in the EU was the number one priority for respondents
between 18 and 24 years of age, students, college and university graduates, and for the
unemployed. Among these social groups, the future of agriculture was considered the
second most important issue for the negotiations. Respondents who declared the
knowledge of at least one foreign language believed that the right to work in the EU
was at least as important as the future of agriculture.
6Farmers as a group attached relatively little importance to the right to work in
EU countries. Only 34% of the surveyed farmers indicated the issue as being the most
important, while 87% held the opinion that the most important issue was the future of
Polish agriculture. It is also particularly interesting to note that barely 15% farmers
mentioned the purchase of land by foreigners; they considered the issue the least
important of the five listed topics.
On the whole, the right to work abroad is the most important to the groups
showing particularly strong support for integration, whereas weak support for
integration is accompanied by a greater interest in the future of agriculture. Thus, one
may conclude that the outcome of talks between Poland and the EU concerning the
right for Poles to work in the EU will have a major impact on the level of public
support for integration.
The importance attached to Poles achieving the right to work on the territory
of the European Union may be a result of two factors. On the one hand, Poles may be
interested in seeking employment abroad. However, on the other hand, it is also
possible that Poles are interested in their country becoming a fully fledged member of
the Union, a member that would have all the rights enjoyed by other member states,
although personally, they have no intention of going to work abroad. Thus, the point
might be an equal treatment of all the citizens of the Union, and a fear that Poles would
become second class citizens.6
Nevertheless, it should be noted that Poles do not expect that they will be
granted that right immediately upon the achievement of the EU membership by Poland,
and they expect a transition period of several years.
In all social groups (with the exception of farmers), the number of people
holding the opinion that Poles will have to wait before they get the right to work in the
Union was twice the number of respondents who expected that Poles would be able to
work abroad right after the accession to the Union.
Table 3
Opinions about Poles being granted the right to work legally abroad
In your opinion, after Poland’s accession to the
European Union, will Poles have the right to work
legally abroad?
Replies in percent
N=1100
Yes, right after the accession 18
Yes, but only after several years from the time of
accession to the Union 40
No 10
Difficult to say 32
Total 100
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The fact that Poles expect that they will achieve the right to work in the EU
member states as a result of the negotiations does not mean that they are personally
inclined to exercise that right. They see their future in their own country, in a fast
growing private sector. They are also increasingly confident in their own potential.
Over the past five years, a major growth has been observed in the number of people
who would like to work in their own businesses. A definite willingness to work abroad
was declared by only one out of ten Poles taking part in the survey. Among young
people and among the unemployed, the percentage of respondents interested in seeking
such employment was higher than the average.
Table 4
Preferences concerning employment
Preferred type of employment
Replies in percent
N=1100
August 1992
N=1823
CBOS polling
centre figures
May 1998
N=1100
Institute of Public
Affairs figures
Running one’s own business 26 41
State-owned (or co-operative) company 29 20
Private company (or denationalised
company)
25 10
Work abroad 6 10
Not working at all 4 9
Difficult to say 10 10
Total 100 100
Source: Data obtained by the Institute of Public Affairs; Planowane zmiany i
preferencje dotycz ce miejsca pracy. Komunikat z bada  (Intended changes and
preferences concerning place of work. Report from research) published by the CBOS
polling centre, Warsaw, August 1992.
Nearly three quarters of Poles, being given a free choice, would decide to work
as hired labour or to run their own businesses in Poland, and only one in ten Poles
would prefer to emigrate and seek employment abroad. Nevertheless, it should be
noted that one in four respondents (26%) would encourage their own children to go to
work abroad. But that concerned mainly temporary work. Thus, one may presume that
the main purpose of going to work abroad would be to get professional experience, to
enhance one’s knowledge and orientation in the world, as well as to gather capital in
order to start an independent life in Poland, i.e., to establish one’s own business or to
buy an apartment.
Table 5
Preferences concerning the place of work of one’s child
8Preferred place of work
Replies
in
percent
N=110
0
A good job in Poland 62
Temporary work abroad 18
Permanent migration abroad 8
Difficult to say 12
Total 100
Source: Data obtained by the Institute of Public Affairs.
Under these circumstances, the importance attached to the achievement of the
right for Poles to work abroad need not be a result of their personal readiness to take
advantage of that possibility. To many respondents, it is rather a matter of Poland’s
future and the future of the young generation of Poles for whom they would like to
ensure the same opportunities as those enjoyed by the citizens of other member states.
Research conducted by the Institute of Public Affairs provides grounds for the
conclusion that, although nearly three quarters of Poles (73%) believe that they are not
provided sufficient information about the ongoing negotiations, they have a clear
opinion concerning Poland’s readiness for the talks (86%). The number of Poles who
think that their country is well prepared for the negotiations (42%) is nearly the same
as the number of those who believe that it is not prepared well enough (44%).7
In this context, the most important opinions are those concerning the factors
which determine the negotiation process, i.e., whether its course depends on Poland
itself, the pace of its reforms and modernisation, or it depends on external factors, the
political will of the EU member states, the economic situation, or the personal
characteristics of negotiators.
Table 6
Opinions concerning the factors which impact on the terms of Poland’s accession
to the European Union
Factors that impact on the terms of
Poland’s accession to the European
Union
Replies in percent
February 1998
Replies in percent
June 1998
The level of advancement of Polish
reforms and the country’s
modernisation
35 30
Political decisions of EU member states 31 29
Qualifications, skills and determination
of Polish negotiators 20 23
Difficult to say 14 18
Total 100 100
Source: Data obtained by the Institute of Public Affairs.
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9The Polish public are divided over the factors determining the terms of
Poland’s accession to the European Union. In the course of time and together with the
advancement of the negotiations the opinions held by Poles are becoming increasingly
scattered. In addition, the past four months have seen a growth in the number of
people who cannot identify the factors which determine the terms of Poland’s
accession to the Union. Instead of the expected crystallisation of the public’s attitude
towards the negotiations, the launching of the talks has blurred the perception of the
process. That may be explained with the impact produced by incomplete information
supplied out of context, which is at the same time complex, and which the public
receive via the media.
The number of respondents regarding the advancement of reform and
modernisation processes as the most important is nearly the same as the number of
those who attach the greatest importance to political decisions of EU member states.
The group of Poles who believe that the outcome of the ongoing talks is determined
predominantly by the qualifications, skills and determination of Polish negotiators is
not much smaller.
The advancement of reform and modernisation processes was particularly often
indicated as the factor determining the terms of Poland’s accession to the Union by
representatives of the intellectual elite (college and university graduates, people
holding managerial positions and white-collar workers), public sector workers, as well
as by the highest income earners. At the same time, the opinion that the terms of
accession would depend on the attitude of persons involved in the negotiations was the
least frequent among the intellectual elite.
The greatest weight was attached to political decisions of EU member states
especially by respondents holding managerial positions, college and university
graduates, as well as by Poles professionally connected with or living in rural areas.
The fact that the belief in the decisive power of political choices made by EU
member states was the strongest among college and university graduates seems to
reflect that group’s strong consciousness of the role of the public opinion in EU
countries. As one may see, that belief is accompanied by pro-reformatory or pro-
modernisation attitudes. However, the same belief in the vital importance of political
decisions of EU countries, may be a result of a feeling of helplessness with regard to
the Union as a stronger partner. Therefore, differences in attitudes towards integration
may be observed mainly in replies to the question concerning the determination of
negotiators and the need for the country to be well prepared.
One may say that people who vest their hopes in the integration processes have
a different approach towards the negotiations compared to those who are dominated
by fears. The former group attach a relatively greater importance to achieving terms of
accession, which would provide Poles with new opportunities for activity. Members of
the latter group hold the opinion that successful negotiations involve predominantly
safeguarding Poland’s status quo. Groups that hold defensive attitudes tend to view
the talks as a zero-result game in which benefits for one of the sides must imply losses
for the other side. That approach by principle rules out the possibility of working out
arrangements advantageous for both sides during the process of negotiations.8
3.  Expected benefits and losses related to integration
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Support for European integration is connected with expected benefits that the
accession to the European Union may produce for Poland and its citizens.
According to respondents, in Poland, integration will be advantageous mainly
for intellectual, business and political elites. On the other hand, the accession to the
Union is particularly often seen as disadvantageous for blue-collar workers and
farmers.
The people have no doubts concerning the future situation of foreign
businessmen and Polish elites; opinions on the matter are concerted and clear. A
greater diversification of opinions may be observed concerning potential benefits of the
process in the case of blue-collar workers, the unemployed, farmers, and the former
communist apparatchiks. Poles believe that there is no relationship between Poland’s
accession to the European Union and the situation of the Polish clergy (that opinion is
shared by the clergymen themselves).
Table 7
Opinions concerning the benefits produced by Poland’s integration with the
European Union for particular social groups.
Social group
Replies in percent
N=1100
will gain
from
integration
will lose
because of
integration
will neither
gain nor
lose
difficult to
say
Foreign businessmen 72 5 9 14
Well educated people 67 6 13 14
Polish businessmen 64 14 9 13
Political elites 61 9 14 16
Blue-collar workers 23 40 18 19
Fraudsters and con men 41 22 16 21
Former communist apparatchiks 23 22 25 30
The unemployed 33 27 21 19
The clergy 18 18 38 26
Farmers 16 54 12 18
Source: Data obtained by the Institute of Public Affairs
Respondents who regard European integration as an opportunity for
themselves and for the remaining social groups are mainly the intellectual and business
elites, as well as the unemployed and people between 25 and 59 years of age. Thus,
one may say that integration is considered advantageous mostly by people whose
financial situation is the best, and by those who are the most active in the economy.
Although there is a prevailing belief among the public that blue-collar workers
and farmers will lose as a result of the integration process, but in certain social groups
a large number of respondents were more optimistic in their projections. For example,
the expectation that integration would improve the situation of the workers was more
frequently declared by private entrepreneurs (35%), college and university graduates
(32%), and by the unemployed (32%). The opinion that the process would produce
11
advantages for farmers was more frequent among the unemployed (21%), as well as
among private entrepreneurs (18%) and white-collar workers (18%).
A negative impact to be produced by integration on the situation of blue-collar
workers was expected especially by the public sector workers (48%), farmers (48%),
and respondents holding managerial positions. It is interesting to note that
deterioration in the situation of farmers was expected more frequently by people
holding managerial positions (71%) than by farmers themselves (64%). The research
supplied yet another proof of the differentiation of opinions among the rural
population. Whereas 64% of farmers and 63% of farm workers were convinced that
integration would impact negatively on the situation of farmers, the figure for the rural
population was only 52%.
Opinions concerning the impact of the integration process on the situation of
the unemployed were not unanimous. The unemployed themselves were rather
optimistic about their future. The belief that the process would be advantageous for
them was declared by 36% of the unemployed, i.e., more frequently compared the
average figure for the entire surveyed population. The opinion that integration would
improve the situation of the unemployed was particularly often declared by students
(47%) and young people (43%), as well as by the poorest respondents (41%).
Respondents convinced about the negative impact of Poland’s accession to the Union
on the situation of the unemployed included inhabitants of large cities and unskilled
workers.
The criminal aspect of integration (benefits to be produced for fraudsters and
con men) was particularly often indicated by farm workers (63%), farmers (56%), the
unemployed (49%), and by respondents with an average level of income per household
member, i.e., between PLN 301 and PLN 400 per month per head (49%). An
optimistic opinion regarding that aspect of integration was held by private
entrepreneurs, among whom the prevailing view (38%) was that fraudsters and con
men would lose as a result of the process.
Having compared the results of research by the Institute of Public Affairs and
the results obtained by the CBOS polling centre in 1992,9 one may say that there has
been a change in the public perception of the consequences of European integration for
workers, farmers and the unemployed. Six years ago, the optimistic opinion that the
situation of workers will improve was more frequent, while now the common belief is
the opposite. A change has also been observed in the projected impact of integration
on the situation of farmers. In 1992, opinions expecting an improvement were as
frequent as those projecting a deterioration. Now, the prevailing belief is that
integration will impact negatively on the situation of farmers. On the other hand, a
greater optimism has been observed regarding the public’s opinion on the impact that
Poland’s accession to the EU will produce on the situation of the unemployed. Six
years ago, the opinion expecting a deterioration was voiced more often, while now, the
optimistic opinion that integration will improve the situation of the jobless is held by a
greater number of people.
Thus, one may say that farmers are the most pessimistic in evaluating their
own situation in the context of European integration. As a group, they also feel the
greatest confusion concerning the process of negotiations.
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